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COMMENTS
TREATY FISHING RIGHTS: A HABITAT RIGHT AS PART
OF THE TRINITY OF RIGHTS IMPLIED BY THE FISHING
CLAUSE OF THE STEVENS TREATIES
0. Yale Lewis HPJ*

Abstract: The fishing right guaranteed by the fishing clause of the Stevens
Treaties between the United States and the Indians of Western Washington
should be considered a trinity of rights: a right of access, a right of
equitable apportionment, and a habitat right. While seven different Supreme
Court decisions and scores of lower court decisions examine the contours of
the first two elements of the fishing right, the contours of the final element
of the right remain unsettled. No appeals court has ruled on whether there,
is an implied habitat right. While some trial courts have skirted the issue,
only one has addressed it directly, with the opinion vacated on appeal. This
Comment examines the proposed implied habitat right and explains why
courts should recognize it.
One of the most significant and long-simmering legal disputes in Western
Washington entered a new phase in January 2001, when local Indian tribes
filed a "Request for Determination"' in the context of United States v.
Washington The Request for Determination is based on the fishing clause
of the Stevens Treaties between the United States and the "fishing Indians"
of what is now Western Washington? It asks the court to impose a duty on
*J.D., 2002, University of Washington; M.S., 1992, Columbia School of Journalism;
B.A., 1988, Middlebury College. Currently, the author is an attorney with the Swinomish

Tribal Community, near La Conner, Washington.
First place winner, 2001-02 American Indian Law Review writing competition.
1. Request for Determination, United States v. Washington, Civ. No. C70-9213 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).
2. United States v. Washington spawned the original Judge Boldt decision allocating up
to half the harvestable salmon to the Indians. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975). In subsequent rounds
of United States v. Washington, the courts have allocated half the shellfish and any other
marine species with commercial value to the Indians. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d
630, 651 (9th Cir. 1998). The tribes have also litigated disputes among themselves about the
boundaries of their respective usual and accustomed fishing places in the context of United
States v. Washington and progeny. See, e.g., United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d
443 (9th Cir. 2000).
3. The term "fishing Indians" refers to any of the Indians who lived from the Pacific
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the State of Washington to construct and maintain culverts under state
highways so that salmon and other fish have unobstructed passage between
their spawning grounds and the sea.' According to three different studies
by the State of Washington, improperly maintained culverts prevent
anadromous fish5 from accessing over 400,000 square meters of potentially
productive salmonid spawning habitat.6 If the culverts were fixed, salmon
would regain access to this habitat, producing approximately 200,000 more
adults per year.!
This Comment argues that courts should recognize the habitat right
implicit in the tribes' Request for Determination. Without judicial recognition of a habitat right, anadromous fish populations will continue to perish
and the treaty fishing right will become even emptier than it already is.' In
today's world of polluted, riprapped, 9 channelized, unvegetated, and
otherwise degraded streams, the Indians' fishing right is becoming an empty
'promise.'" If the tribes had a habitat right, they could use it to make the
fishing right meaningful, demanding that the state take simple, cost-effective
steps to protect fish habitat, such as fixing the culverts.

Coast to the Cascade foothills, subsisting primarily on fish and seafood when they signed the
Stevens Treaties in 1855. See, e.g., Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitatfor Off-Reservation
Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL.
L. 279, 287 (2000).
4. See Request for Determination, supra note I, at 1-2.
5. Anadromous fish spawn in freshwater, emigrate to the sea during the spring floods,
spend their adult years in the ocean, then return to their natal streams to spawn. Salmon and
certain species of trout and char are anadromous. See generally JOHN R. MAGNUSON
(CHAIR), NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM:

NORTHWEST 7-8 (1996).
6. The three reports are: WASH.

SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC

STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP.

&

WASH. STATE DEP'r OF

FISH & WILDLIFE, FISH PASSAGE PROGRAM PROGRESS PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR
BIENNIUM 1991-1993; WASH. STATE DEPT OF TRANSP. & WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FISH &
WILDLIFE, FISH PASSAGE PROGRAM PROGRESS PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR BIENNIUM 19931995; and WASH. STATE DEP'T OF TRANS. & WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, FISH
PASSAGE PROGRAM DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FINAL REPORT, 1997.

7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Mason B. Bryant & Fred H. Everest, Management Condition of
Watersheds in Southeast Alaska: The Persistence of Anadromous Salmon, 72 NORTHWEST
SCI. 249-67 (1998) (discussing the importance of unadulterated habitat for salmon
production).
9. "Rip-Rap" refers to a layer of boulders or other hard material laid on an
embankment to protect it from erosion. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1960 (1981).
10. For example, tribal harvests in Western Washington declined from over 5,000,000
anadromous fish in 1986 to about 500,000 fish in 1999. See Request for Determination,
supra note I, at 4.
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To place the proposed habitat right in the context of the other elements
of the fishing right that courts already recognize, this Comment describes

the fishing right as a trinity of subsidiary, interdependent rights: the right3
of access," the right of equitable apportionment," and the habitat right.

Each element of the trinity has its own constituent elements."' Although
courts impliedly recognize the right of accessS and the right of equitable
apportionment,'" they have not yet recognized the habitat right.'
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I defines the proposed
habitat right. Part II explains the historic importance of salmon to the
Indians of what is now Western Washington and the negotiations that
produced the Stevens Treaties. Part III mentions the canons of construction
courts use to interpret Indian treaties.' Stevens Treaties case law is then

l1.See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text. The right of access refers to the
Indians' treaty right to trespass on and occupy non-Indian land in order to exercise their
fishing rights at usual and accustomed places. It is a bedrock principle of Stevens treaty
Indian law. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 444 (Rennard S.
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
12. See infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text. The right of equitable apportionment
guarantees the Indians the right to catch up to half the harvestable fish. The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the right of equitable apportionment in Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See also Michael Blumm
& Brett Swift, The Indian Piscary Profit and HabitatProtection in the Pacific Northwest:
A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 452-59 (1998).
13. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text. "Habitat" means the environmental
conditions that fish populations need to survive and prosper. See United States v.
Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (Orrick Decision), affd, 759 F.2d
1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. The right of access includes the right to trespass and camp on fee land during the
fishing season, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), the right to fish without
paying state-imposed license fees, Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942), and the
right to fish free of discriminatory state regulations, Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup
Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973); accord Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 907 (D. Or.
1969); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). The right of
equitable apportionment includes the right to an equitable share of the hatchery fish, Orrick
Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 197, and is not restricted by the treaty with Canada allocating
Fraser River salmon, United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 411 (W.D. Wash.
1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
15. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-46.
17. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 12, at 414-19; see also Brian J. Perron, When
TribalFishing Rights Become a Mere Opportunity to Dip One's Net into the Water and Pull
It Out Empty: The Case for Money Damages When Treaty-Reserved Fish Habitat Is
Degraded, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 783, 784-85 (2001).
18. See infra notes 92-100. The canons of construction establish a methodology by
which the courts interpret Indian treaties. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 221-25; see also
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discussed in terms of the three elements of the proposed trinity plus two
corollary judicial doctrines that both support and limit the proposed habitat
right: the reserved water right, 9 and the conservation necessity." Finally,
Part IV argues that the habitat right should be recognized as the third right

in the proposed trinity.
L Potential Scope of the Implied Habitat Right
Courts recognize that anadromous fish require certain basic environmental
conditions to survive and prosper, including 1) access to and from the sea,
2) an adequate supply of good-quality water, 3) a sufficient amount of
suitable gravel for spawning and egg incubation, 4) an ample supply of
food, and 5) sufficient shelter.' The implied habitat right would give tribes
a cause of action to preserve and restore those conditions in local watersheds.' Armed with the implied habitat fight, tribes could force state and
local governments as well as private developers to consider the environmental effects of a particular development long before a given fish population
heads towards extinction and becomes subject to the Endangered Species
Act." In some cases, tribes could even go to court and demand removal of
certain developments such as the Lower Snake River dams, that create an
especially severe impact on salmon mortality.2 '

David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37 (1999); Phillip P. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and Interpretationin Federal

Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381 (1993).
19. The reserved water rights doctrine holds that when Congress created a federal
reservation, such as an Indian reservation, it implicitly reserved enough water to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation. See infra notes 172-211 and accompanying text. The U.S.
Supreme Court first articulated the reserved water rights doctrine in United States v. Winters,
207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). The U.S. Supreme Court applied the right most recently in
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 396 (2000).

20. The conservation necessity recognizes that the Indians cannot fish their fish to
extinction. The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the conservation necessity in Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 683 (1942). Since the Tulee decision, the conservation necessity
has been a feature of every U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting the Stevens Treaties.
See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980), affd, 759
F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
22. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 12, at 473-76; see also Perron, supra note 17, at
784-85; see also Ivy Anderson, Protecting the Salmon: An Implied Right of Habitat
Protection in the Stevens Treaties and Its Impact on the Columbia River Basin, 24 VT. L.
REV. 143, 160-69 (1999).
23. Id.
24. See Nancy K. Kubasek & Chaz A. Giles, Dammed to Be Divided: Resolving the
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The implied habitat right could also give tribes more leverage in Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission proceedings to demand that a particular dam
operate in a more fish-friendly fashion. For example, the Skokomish Indians
could intervene in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proceedings
re-authorizing the Lake Cushman Dams.' Potential habitat restoration
projects in this case range from simply restoring flows below the lowermost
dam, to equipping one or both of the dams with fish ladders, to removing
the lowermost dam, or removing both dams." To help select the appropriate restoration option, the tribes could measure the habitat right in
terms of money, estimating the value of the fish killed by the dam,
comparing the value of the fish to the value of the electricity produced by
the dam, and then seek equitable relief based on a combination of habitat
restoration and/or financial compensation."'
The implied habitat right would not create a "wilderness servitude"
requiring the government to return salmon habitat to 1855 conditions.'
Rather, it would be a tool the Indians could use to prevent threatened habitat
destruction and, where appropriate, restore damaged habitat. It could be
limited by the moderate living standard,' so that tribes couldn't prevent all
development, only development that threatens their ability to catch enough
fish to attain a moderate living from fishing." Once a tribe achieves a
moderate living from fishing, the habitat right would become a "negative
right." Tribes could prevent new developments that threaten their ability
to achieve a moderate living, but they could not destroy old developments
that might prevent higher tribal harvests.'2
Judicial recognition of an implied habitat right would boost the Indian
economy, preserve a treasured cultural icon, and begin restoration of

Controversy over the Destruction of the Snake River Dams and Providing a Model for Future
Decision-Making, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 675, 688-719 (2001). See
generally Rollie Wilson, Removing Dam Development to Recover Columbia Basin Treaty
Protected Salmon Economies, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 357 (2000).
25. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT CUSHMAN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT No. 460, at 2-2 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.at 2-16 to 2-17, 5-4 to 5-17.

28. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 12, at 493.
29. The moderate living standard refers to the number of fish the tribes need to harvest
to earn a "moderate living" through fishing. The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the
moderate living standard in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 686-88 (1979).
30. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 12, at 490-500.
31. Id. at 500.
32. Ld.
at 490-500.
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ecological function to under-functioning wetland, riverine, and estuarine
environments. For example, one report estimated that the Lake Cushman
Dams caused over $5 billion worth of damage to the Skokomish tribe and
economy between 1926 and 1997." Simply returning flows to the North
Fork of the Skokomish River would return life-giving water to formerly
productive fish habitat and at least partially restore the normal process of
sediment transportation, flushing out small gravel and other debris that
degrades spawning habitat and restoring much-needed debris to the river
delta.'
The implied habitat right would give tribes the ability to protect the
environmental conditions needed for fish populations to survive and prosper.
This tool would bring the needs of salmon to the bargaining table when land
use planners and developers make decisions about development. It could
also force citizens and political leaders to think proactively about how to
restore salmon habitat in a cost-effective and creative manner. By recognizing and then enforcing the implied habitat right, the courts could initiate
a process to strengthen the culture and spirit of Indians and non-Indians
alike.
II. Treaty Negotiations Between the United States and the Fishing Indians
of Western Washington
The Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest long relied on salmon for
their physical and spiritual nourishment and' as the basis for their
economy, religion, and culture.' Because of salmon, the Pacific Northwest
.Indians developed one of the few hunter/gatherer societies in the world that
consistently produced more food and material wealth than it needed for
subsistence." The fishing clause of the Stevens Treaties was designed to
protect the source of this wealth - the salmon. ' When Isaac Stevens
negotiated the treaties that bear his name, he was well aware of the
significance the Indians attributed to salmon." By assuring the Indians that
33. FED. ENERGY

REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 25, at 2-2.
34. Id.
35. See BARBARA LANE, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INDIAN/WHITE
CULTURE CONTACT IN WESTERN WASHINGTON IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY, PART 11, at
(1973); accord WILLIAM ELMENDORF & A.L. KROEBER, TWANA CULTURE 59-63 (1992).

6

36. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
(Boldt Decision), affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975) (Phase I); accord AM. FRIENDS
SERV. COMM., UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY 3 (1970 ed.) [hereinafter UNCOMMON
CONTROVERSY].

37. See UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at 3.
38. See Phase I, 520 F.2d at 685.
39. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
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the United States would always protect their right to catch salmon, he
avoided a needless and potentially inhumane war and paved the way for
non-Indian settlement in the Pacific Northwest.'
A. The Indian Salmon Fishery Before the Treaties
Salmon have always been at the heart of Pacific Northwest Indian
culture." Salmon were central to the Indians' diet, religion, calendar, and
system of property rights.' To maintain their runs of salmon, the various
Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest developed religious practices that
centered on salmon."3 Salmon were also central to the Northwest Indians'
calendar and understanding of the night sky. For example, the Quileute
Indians, who lived on the coast near the mouth of the Quileute River, named
four periods of the year for the four great runs of salmon that spawned on
the Quileute River during the year." The Nisquallys, meanwhile, spoke of
a constellation called "edad," meaning fish weir, saw Orion's belt as three
fishermen and his sword as a school of fish, and regarded the northern lights
as a school of herring exposing their white bellies to the night air.'5
To the extent that an Indian system of private property rights existed, it
focused on salmon. Each tribe maintained a winter village along a particular
river." Within the tribes, individual fisherman had hereditary rights to fish
at particular spots along the river near their winter villages. There also
existed shared rights to fish with people from other villages near their spring
and summer fish camps based on ties of marriage and kinship.' This
system, for the most part, eliminated any need for intertribal warfare over
fishing grounds, allowed for escapement,' and allowed sufficient numbers
of fish to become available for upstream fisherman.49
U.S. 658, 666 (1979) (Fishing Vessel).
40. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 355; see also JOSEPH T. HAZARD, COMPANION
OF ADVENTURE 121-23 (1952).
41. See, e.g., UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at 3 (1967 ed.).
42. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 350; see also LANE, supra note 35, at 18.
43. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 665.
44. See FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL 22-23 (1986) [hereinafter TREATIES ON
TRIAL].

45. Id.
46. Timothy Wold, After the Boldt Decision: The Question of Inter-Tribal Allocation
23 (1989) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Washington) (on file at the University
of Washington library).
47. Id.
48. Escapement refers to the minimum number of spawners necessary to "escape"
mankind's efforts to catch them, spawn, and produce the next generation of salmon.
MAGNUSON, supra note 5, at 13.
49. See id. at 25; accord TREATIES ON TRIAL, supra note 44, at 24.
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B. The Treaty Negotiations
Isaac Stevens, first governor of Washington Territory and first Indian
superintendent of Washington Territory,' made some attempts to preserve
the Indian fishing allocation system when he negotiated the Stevens
Treaties." Indeed, he and his advisors discussed the need to preserve the
Indians' fishing rights several months before beginning their treaty-making
tour on Puget Sound and the Straits of Juan de Fuca in the winter of 18545552 Based on these discussions, Stevens also decided to "liberalize"'3 the
terms of the treaty that his superiors in Washington D.C. suggested.'
Stevens negotiated treaties that confined the Indians to their winter villages
on their reservations in the winter, but in the summer allowed them to roam
freely over their aboriginal fishing and hunting grounds, set up fish camps,
and catch fish as they always had. 5 The often-quoted' speech that
Governor Stevens delivered to the Indians during treaty negotiations at
Point-No-Point indicated Stevens' intent to protect the Indians' fish:
Are you not my children and also children of the Great
Father? What will I not do for my children, and what will you
not do for yours? Would you not die for them? This paper is
such as a man would give to his children and I will tell you
why. This paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his
children a home? ....This paper secures your fish. Does not
a father give food to his childrenP'
Stevens conducted the negotiations in the Chinook jargon, a trade patois
consisting of some 300 words from English, French, and various Indian
dialects, inadequate to communicate the Indian equivalents of many of the

50. Stevens was also a West Point graduate, a Colonel in the prestigious U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, and Chief of the Northern Pacific Railroad Survey. See HAZARD, supra
note 40, at 4-18.
51. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355-57 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. See HAZARD, supra note 40, at 122-23.
53. For example, despite his reluctance to contravene orders, Stevens agreed with his
staff that the Indians would be better served by many small reservations than one or two
larger ones. See KENT D. RICHARDS, ISAAC I.STEVENS: YOUNG MAN IN A HURRY 202
(1979).

54. See HAZARD, supra note 40, at 122.
55. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 666 n.9 (1979).
56. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 192 (W.D: Wash. 1980), affid,
759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss1/4

No. 1]

COMMENTS

English terms used in the treaty."' It is unclear why Stevens chose to use
Chinook rather than translate directly from English to the appropriate Indian
dialect.59 In later years, an individual considering himself fluent in Chinook
stated that the language could not have been used to translate the treaties'
terms into words understandable to the Indians.'
C. The Stevens Treaties
Stevens began his treaty-making tour on Christmas Eve, 1854, on the
banks of Medicine Creek in South Puget Sound." Ten months later, on the
banks of the Judith River in Montana, he negotiated his tenth and final
treaty. 2 During each negotiation, he read from a pre-drafted document,
each containing virtually identical terms.63 As a result of each negotiation,
the Indians ceded vast, if not all, swaths of their aboriginal territory in
exchange for items and services such as blankets and blacksmith shops."
By far the most important element of the treaty negotiations, however, was
not what the Indians either ceded or received, but what they retained.' In
addition to small reservations of land, the Indians retained the fishing right
as codified in the fishing clause:'
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams, where
running through or bordering said reservation, is further secured
to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right
of taking fish at usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens of the Territory; and of erecting temporary buildings for
curing them; together with the privilege of hunting, gathering
roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open
and unclaimed lands.

58. See TREATIES ON TRIAL, supra note 44, at 37.

59. Owen Bush, a member of Stevens' staff, knew many of the local dialects, but was
not allowed to translate. The official interpreter, Colonel Shaw, only knew Chinook. See
UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at 23.
60. Id. at 24.
61. See HAZARD, supra note 40, at 123.
62. Treaty with the Blackfeet, Oct. 17, 1855, 11 Stat. 657, reprinted in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS & TREATIES 736 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).
63. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Puget
Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Or., 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (1978)
(vacated on other grounds).
64. See HAZARD, supra note 40, at 122.
65. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
66. See Treaty with the Yakamas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
67. Id.
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The general meaning of the fishing clause emerges clearly from the
historical record. Stevens was under orders to extinguish Indian title to the
vast majority of their aboriginal territory to make way for non-Indian
settlement." The Indians, meanwhile, wanted to preserve their way of life
as much as possible, which to them meant preserving their right to catch as
much salmon as they always had." The fishing clause reflects these concers. The Stevens Treaties guaranteed individual fishermen the right to
continue seasonal fishing at their usual and accustomed fishing places off
the reservation."' It also allowed at least some Indians to continue living
in their winter villages. Stevens allowed displaced Indians to build new
winter villages on the reservations.72
Governor Stevens viewed the fishing clause in a similar vein.' To him,
it was both cheap and humane to let the Indians continue fishing as they had
always done. In Stevens' view, the reservations were adequate in size
because they were placed in locations where the Indians could continue to
fish, hunt, and "participate in the labor of the Sound."' In his official
communications to the President, Stevens defended his decision to let the
Indians continue fishing because it allowed them to be self-supporting and
wouldn't interfere with non-Indians."6 Furthermore, the fishing clause
allowed the Indians to continue supplying the non-Indians with most of their
fish and other seafood, including the salmon they cured for export.'
The historical record indicates that the Indians understood the fishing
clause of the Stevens Treaties as a guarantee that the federal government
would protect their fisheries in perpetuity. Stevens probably understood the
treaty in the same light. It is unknown whether he was motivated by a sense
of common humanity, noblesse oblige, or a simple desire to reduce the cost
of feeding the Indians. From a legal standpoint, it is also irrelevant.

68. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 1998).
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355-58 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
(Boldt Decision), afd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975); accord UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at 21.
71. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 353-54; accord UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY,
supra note 36, at 21.
72. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 353-54; accord UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY,
supra note 36, at 21.
73. See UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at 21.
74. See RICHARDS, supra note 53, at 201.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See TREATIES ON TRIAL, supra note 44, at 38.
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I. Stevens Treaty Case Law

Courts recognize that the fishing clause guarantees the Indians enough fish
to make the fishing right meaningful."' Indeed, Stevens Treaties case law
can be read as a series of contemporaneous responses to declining fish runs
and judicial efforts to fashion new doctrines designed to enforce the treaties
central guarantee - that the Indians would always have enough fish to
maintain their way of life.'9 To enforce this guarantee, over the last
century, courts developed the right of access and the right of equitable
apportionment."' In addition, some lower court decisions laid the foundation for recognition of the proposed habitat right." If recognized, this
third right would be the final element of the proposed trinity.
Stevens Treaties case law recognizes two more doctrines that inform and
limit these rights: the reserved water right" and the conservation necessity."' While the first two elements of the trinity, the right of access and the
right of equitable apportionment, are firmly established, the habitat right is
not. Likewise, the reserved water right is not unequivocally analogized to
the reserved habitat right and the conservation necessity is not unequivocally
interpreted so as to restrict the state's ability to destroy, or permit the
destruction of, productive fish habitat.
A. The Canons of Construction
Since the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall in the early days of the
U.S. Supreme Court, courts interpret treaties between the United States and
the tribes, including the Stevens Treaties, in light of the special canons of
construction for Indian treaties.' At mid-century, the Court stated that
these canons required consideration of "the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties."" Citing
multiple Supreme Court cases, Felix Cohen, a preeminent scholar of
American Indian law,"' stated that the canons of construction require the
78. See infra notes 96-174 and accompanying text.
79. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 676-79 (1979).
80. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 172-211 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979).
86. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
87. Felix Cohen wrote the definitive treatise on American Indian law. See, e.g., Bethany
Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas:Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM. INDIAN
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courts to construe the treaties liberally in favor of the Indians,u resolve
ambiguous expressions in favor of the Indians,"9 and interpret the treaties
as the Indians would have understood them at the time." Echoing Cohen,
the most recent U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting an Indian treaty uses
identical language.'
B. The Right of Access
In United States v. Winans,' in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the fishing clause of the Stevens Treaties contained a right of access, also
described as a "fishing servitude." 3 The conflict here began after the
Winans brothers installed fishwheels at the Yakama" Indians' "usual and
accustomed" fishing grounds on the Columbia River at the Washington /
Oregon border" and attempted to prevent the Indians from accessing their
traditional fishing stations." The local U.S. Attorney then sought an

1, 3 (1997).
88. Cohen cites the following cases for the proposition that courts must construe treaties
liberally in the Indian's favor: Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 431-32; Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
COHEN, supra note 11, at 222.
89. Cohen cites the following cases for the proposition that courts must resolve
ambiguous expressions in favor of the Indians: McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). COHEN, supra note 11, at 222.
90. Cohen cites the following cases for the proposition that courts should construe
Indian treaties as the Indians would have understood them at the time: Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 11I,
116
(1938); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). COHEN, supra note 11, at 222.
91. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195-96 (1999)
(holding that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa retained their usufructuary hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights on lands ceded to the United States).
92. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
93. The U.S. Supreme Court used the term "servitude" to describe the Indian's right of
access in United States v. Winans. Id. at 381-82. Commentators have since developed the
term "fishing servitude." See, e.g., Blumm & Swift, supra note 12. Blumm uses the terms
"fishing servitude" and "piscary profit a pendre" interchangeably. "Piscary" means fishing
place. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1723 (1981). The holder of a
"profit a pendre" has the right to take part in (profit from) the produce or soil of the land of
another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, a "piscary profit a pendre"
is the right to fish on someone else's land.
94. The Yakama Indian Nation officially changed the spelling of "Yakima" to "Yakama"
by resolution in 1972. Tribal Council Res. T-053-94 (Yakama Nation 1994).
95. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378 (1905) (quoting 1859 Treaty between
United States and Yakima Nation).
96. Id. at 380.
L.

REV.
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injunction against the Winans brothers on the Indians' behalf.7 The Court
found for the Indians, articulating the canon of construction that the
language of the fishing clause should be construed "as that unlettered people
understood it."98
The Court observed that the fishing right is "not much less necessary to
the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.""
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Stevens' Treaties contained the implied
right of access, because without access to the fishing sites, the sites were
worthless."' The right of access included the right to camp on the fee land
during the season and smoke or otherwise preserve the fish.''
The Court reaffirmed the right of access in 1919 in Seufert Brothers Co.
v. United States."'a In that case, the Court found that the Yakamas had a
right to fish at their "usual and accustomed places" on the north and south
side of the Columbia River, despite the fact that the lands ceded to the
government during treaty negotiations were only on the north side."' To
construe the Stevens Treaties otherwise would substitute "the natural
meaning of the expression... for the [artificial] meaning which might be
given to it by the law and lawyers. '
The Steven Treaties right of access is well settled. The Indians may
access their usual and accustomed fishing grounds, regardless of who
actually owns the land on which the fishing grounds are located. If nonIndians, such as the Winans brothers, deny access to the fishing grounds, the
Indians may get an injunction requiring the non-Indians to permit access.
C. The Right of Equitable Apportionment
The right to equitable apportionment guarantees the Indians the right to
catch up to half the available fish. A federal district court first recognized
the Indians' right to what is now known as "equitable apportionment" in
1969 in Sohappy v. Smith."' In this case, the Yakama Indians challenged
a regulation allowing commercial fishing in coastal waters and on the
Columbia River below Bonneville Dam, but, for the most part, forbade it
above the dam." This was discriminatory because the Yakama's usual and
97. Id. at 377.

98. Id.at 380.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

ld. at 381.
Id.
Id.
249 U.S. 194 (1919).
Id. at 197-99.

104. Id.at 199.
105. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).

106. Id.at 907-08.
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accustomed fishing places were primarily above the dam whereas the nonIndian commercial fishermen fished exclusively below the dam."" Adding
insult to injury, additional regulations permitted sport fishing above and
below Bonneville dam." However, the Indians could not use this exception because they weren't sport fishermen."'9
To protect their rights, the Indians filed suit in the Western District of
Oregon, seeking a decree defining their Stevens Treaty fishing rights."'
The Court found that during treaty negotiations, the Indians expressed their
paramount interest as protecting their fishing rights."' Following the
canons of construction for Indian treaties," 2 the Sohappy court struck down
the regulations and directed the state to promulgate new ones guaranteeing
the Indians a "fair share" of the fish produced by the Columbia River."3
In a series of cases known as the Puyallup cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the Indians' right to a fair share of the fish."4 In Puyallup I and
Puyallup II, the Indians challenged state regulations banning the use of nets
on the Puyallup and Nisqually Rivers and in Commencement Bay at the
mouths of these rivers."' The State of Washington argued that because
they helped guarantee escapement, the regulations were designed to protect
the fish.' 6 In Puyallup I, the Court held that the State could impose
conservation measures on the Indians provided that the measures met
"appropriate standards" and did not discriminate against the Indians."'
In Puyallup lI, the Court applied the standard enunciated in Puyallup I,
holding that the net bans, while conservation measures, were discriminatory
conservation measures because they allowed in-river hook and line fishing
(sport fishing), practiced exclusively by non-Indians, but forbade net fishing,
practiced exclusively by Indians."' The Court held that the fish should be
"fairly apportioned" between Indians and non-Indians."' Twelve years

107. Id. at 907, 909-11.
108. Id. at 908.
109. Id. at 907-08.
110. Id. at 903.
111. Id. at 906.
112. Id. at 905.
113. Id. at 911.
114. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I); Dep't
of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup I1); Puyallup Tribe v.
Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup ii).
115. Puyalup 1, 391 U.S. at 396; Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 46.
116. Puyalup 1, 391 U.S. at 401; Puyallup I, 414 U.S. at 46.
117. Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398.
118. See Puyallup 1I, 414 U.S. at 48-49.
119. Id.
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later, in Puyallup 111, the Court upheld a trial court's determination that the
Indians were entitled to catch forty-five percent of the harvestable run of
natural steelhead on the river.'"'
In United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), a federal district court
interpreted "fair apportionment" as the right to catch up to half the
harvestable fish.' This litigation began in 1970 with the United States
filing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to define the scope of
treaty fishing rights and require the state to promulgate and enforce
regulations designed to protect that right.' To simplify the proceedings
at trial, Judge Boldt bifurcated the issues into two phases.' Phase 1,
allocation, focused on who got how much of the pie.'" Phase 1I,
hatchery/habitat, focused on the size of the pie."
At the end of Phase I, Judge Boldt found that the right of equitable
apportionment implied in the fishing clause of the Stevens Treaties gave the
Indians the right to catch up to half the harvestable fish that would pass
through their traditional fishing places if not intercepted by non-treaty
fishermen. 2 ' Judge Boldt based this finding primarily on the third canon
of construction, requiring courts to construe Indian treaties as the Indians
understood them at the time.2
Applying this canon to the treaty phrase "incommon with" Boldt first
noted that the Indians probably didn't know precisely what each term meant
because the treaties were written in English and the treaty negotiations were
conducted in Chinook, a jargon that many of the Indians did not understand
and was inadequate in the first place." Language barriers, Judge Boldt
stated, put the Indians at a disadvantage.'29 Therefore, the canons required
Judge Boldt to determine what the Indians thought they were bargaining for
3
during treaty negotiations."' After three years of exhaustive discovery, 1
120. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 177 (1977) (Puyallup

III).
121. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Boldt
Decision), affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975) (Phase I).
122. Id. at 327-28.

123. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. Wash. 1980), affid,
759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (Phase 11); accord Judith W. Constans, The Environmental
Right to Habitat Protection: A Sohappy Solution - United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d
1353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.C. 407 (1985), 61 WASH. L. REV. 731, 732 (1986).
124. Phase 1, 520 F.2d at 689.
125. Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1360.
126. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
127. Id. at 312-31 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899)).
128. Id. at 330.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 330-32.
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Judge Boldt found that the Indians bargained for the right to maintain their
fisheries and their freedom to move about and gather food as they always
had.'32 The allocation of up to half the fish was supposed to make this
consideration meaningful."'
The Ninth Circuit, in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington' 4 and the U.S.
Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel"3 affirmed the Boldt Decision on appeal
with minor modifications. To affirm the right to a maximum of half the
fish, the Fishing Vessel Court"' engaged in its own historical analysis,
using the canons of construction articulated in Winans."' The Fishing
Vessel Court discussed the "vital importance" the Indians placed on their
fishing rights during treaty negotiations.'" The court then reasoned that the
Winans Court found only the right of access because that was all the Indians
needed to "adequately protect" the fishing right at the time."9 But the
fishing right didn't end with access. The right of access was part of a
"greater right" - the right to harvest enough fish to provide the Indians
with a "moderate living," subject to Judge Boldt's fifty percent ceiling.140
The allocation issue decided, Judge Boldt bequeathed the Phase 11 issues,
hatchery and habitat, to a new Judge for the Western District of Washington,
Judge Orrick."' Judge Orrick found that hatchery fish are included in the
Indians' allocation because they were bred to replace wild fish in decline
primarily because of non-Indian development. 2 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed Orrick's decision allocating half the hatchery fish to the Indians
three times, holding that one of the central purposes of the Stevens Treaties
was to guarantee the Indians "an adequate supply of fish" and that including
hatchery fish in the allocation would at least partially meet this guarantee. 14

131. Id. at 328.
132. Id. at 355.
133. See id.

134. 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
135. Washington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 678.

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 678-81.
Id. at 686.
United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (Orrick

Decision), affd, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (Phase !!).

142. Id. at 198-99.
143. Phase 1,759 F.2d at 1358.
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The right of equitable apportionment, therefore, gives the Indians the right
to catch enough fish to maintain a moderate living through fishing, up to the
fifty percent ceiling recognized by Judge Boldt. Hatchery fish are included
in the allocation. In the first few years after the Boldt Decision, tribal
harvests improved.'" Since the mid-eighties, however, fish runs and tribal
harvests declined.'" The problem for Indians today is not their piece of the
pie, it is the size of the pie.'" To address the size of the pie, some courts
have considered the proposed habitat right.
D. The Habitat Right
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington found a
habitat right by focusing on the canons of construction requiring it to discern
the central meaning of the Stevens Treaties.'"1 According to Judge Orrick,
the central concern of the Indians who negotiated the treaties was to
"continue fishing as they had always done."'" He based this finding on the
fact that "fish were the mainstay of the Indian's economy and the focal point
of their culture."' 9 The canons of construction required Orrick to interpret
the Stevens Treaties consistently with the Indians' contemporaneous
understanding of their fishing rights." Orrick articulated the canons as
follows: 1) interpret the treaty so as to "promote [its] central purpose," 2)
in a manner that is sensitive to the "intentions and assumptions" of the
Indians as they entered the treaties, and 3) resolving "any ambiguities ...
in the Indians' favor."'' 1
Judge Orrick's analysis focused on the first canon. Orrick reasoned that
the central premise of the fishing clause was to "reserve to the tribes the
right to continue fishing as an economic and cultural way of life,"'52 which

144. Tribal harvests in Western Washington peaked in the mid to late 1980s, depending
on species. See Northwest lntertribal Fisheries Comm'n, Tribal Salmon Harvests 1970-1997,
at http:lwww.nwifc.wa.govlesalstats.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
145. Id.

146. See Northwest lntertribal Fish Comm'n, Run Reconstruction Data, http://www.
nwifc.wa.gov/fisheriesdata/runreconstrnction.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
147. Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 195.

148. Id. at 192.
149. Id. at 191.
150. Id. at 195.

151. Id. Precisely why the Orrick Decision articulated the canons of construction
slightly differently than they were articulated by Felix Cohen is unclear. See supra notes 8591 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the most recent, and
therefore definitive, statement of the canons of construction in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
152. Orrick Decision, 506 F. Supp. at 205.
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was predicated on "the existence of fish to be taken."'5 3 Fish survival was,
in turn, dependent on habitat.'" Orrick also held that "neither party to the
treaties, nor their successors in interest, may act in a manner that destroys
the fishery."'5 5 According to Judge Orrick, previous holdings were always
based on this general rule.' 56 Therefore, a habitat right was well within the
footprint of the fishing right that the U.S. Supreme Court already recognized.'" If Washington continued to allow, and participate in, habitat
degradation, the fish runs would become extinct and the Stevens Treaties'
guarantee would be broken.'
The Ninth Circuit heard the Orrick Decision three times. Initially, a threejudge panel affirmed but "modified" Orrick on the habitat issue.'59 An en
banc panel of eleven judges then reheard the case and decided that the
state's appeal should be dismissed because the "case was not ripe for judicial
review."'" Finally, a second en banc panel reheard the case but left the
issue of the habitat right undecided.'
The first en banc opinion was
withdrawn and the opinion of the three-judge panel vacated.' None of the
eleven judges hearing the final appeal said they would reverse the lower
court's habitat holding on the merits.'63 However, the court of appeals did
not have enough "concrete facts" to definitively hold that the Stevens
Treaties created a habitat right.' Such guesswork, according to the Ninth
Circuit, was contrary to "sound legal discretion."'"
While the Orrick Decision is the only court decision explicitly recognizing a habitat right, several other lower courts' decisions come close.
These decisions hold that the government may not destroy the Indians' usual
and accustomed fishing grounds. In the first such case, Confederated Tribes
of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander," the U.S. District Court
153. Id. at 203.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 204.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 203.
158. Id.
159. Phillip Katzen, Tribal Rights to Protect the Fishery Habitat Necessary to Exercise
the Treaty Right of Taking Fish, Address Before the 13th Annual American Indian Law
Conference, University of Washington Continuing Legal Education Foundation (Aug. 31,
2000) (on file with author).
160. The first en banc panel is unpublished. Id. at 3.
161. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (Phase 11).
162. Katzen, supra note 159, at 3.
163. Id.
164. Phase I1,
759 F.2d at 1357.
165. Id.
166. 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977).
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for Oregon issued a declaratory judgment requiring the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to seek congressional approval before constructing a dam across
Catherine Creek in Northeastern Oregon because the dam would flood the
Indians' usual and accustomed fishing grounds."" In an analogous case,
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall," the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington enjoined a private developer from building
a marina on usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations on Elliot
Bay, Seattle.' More recently, in Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers,'" the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington affirmed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a permit
to build a fish farm that would restrict access to the Lummi Indian Nation's
usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations in the San Juan Islands
of Northwestern Washington.' These cases effectively preserved productive fish habitat.
Using the canons of construction for Indian treaties as their guiding light,
courts have stated that the Stevens Treaties guarantee the Indians a right of
access to their traditional fishing grounds and a right of equitable apportionment of up to half the harvestable fish. One court expressly recognizes the
implied habitat right. This right was not affirmed on appeal, but other
courts' opinions are logically consistent with it.
E. The Reserved Water Right
The reserved water right supports the finding of an implied habitat right
by analogy. The reserved water rights doctrine, also known as the Winters
doctrine, holds that when Congress reserved land for "federal enclaves" such
as Indian reservations and military bases, it implicitly reserved enough water
to fulfill the reservation's purpose." If the purpose of the reservation is
to promote agriculture, the Winters doctrine reserves enough water to irrigate
all the practicably irrigable acres on the reservation." If the purpose was
to protect fish species, the Winters doctrine reserves enough water to protect
natural spawning and rearing habitat. Today, the controlling question in
any Winters rights dispute is "what was the purpose for which Congress

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
530 U.S.
174.

Id. at 556.
698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
Id. at 1505.
931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
Id. at 1518, 1525.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); accord Arizona v. California,
392, 398 (2000).
See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
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created the reservation and what is the minimum amount of water necessary
to achieve this purpose?"'' 3
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of reserved water
rights in Winters v. United States.'76 In that case, the Court held that when
Congress created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in what is now
Eastern Montana, it implicitly reserved all the water the Indians needed to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation.'77 The Court used the same
reasoning that it used three years earlier in Winans to find the right of
access. "' First, the Court noted that the purpose of the reservation was
conversion of Indians from a "nomadic and uncivilized people" into a
"pastoral and civilized people."'" Next, the Court applied the canons of
construction for Indian treaties: "By a rule of interpretation of agreements
and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from
the standpoint of the Indians." ' In finding an implied water right, the
Court noted that, without water, the purpose of the reservation would be
frustrated. " '
The Supreme Court has examined the contours of the Winters right nine
times over the twentieth century, holding that whenever Congress creates a
federal reservation of land, including an Indian reservation,"' national
forest,"'3 or a national monument,'" it implicitly reserves enough water
to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, but no more.'" In 1963, in
Arizona v. California,'" the Court considered how to measure the scope
of the implied water right. The Court reasoned that because the purpose of
the Great Colorado River Indian Reservation was to provide a homeland for

175. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981).
176. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
177. Id. at 567, 576-77.
178. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379-81 (1905).
179. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
180. Id. at 576-77.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
184. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
185. The scope of the Winters right was the central issue in the following Supreme

Court cases: Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983);
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
186. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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the Indians where they could practice agriculture, the measure of the water
right was enough water to irrigate all the "practicably irrigable acreage on
the reservation" in light of present as well as future needs.' 7
The next major refinement in the Winters Doctrine came in 1975, in
Cappaert v. United States, when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a
Winters' right for the benefit of fish."' Here, a ranching family, the
Cappaerts, began pumping well water from their land, lowering the water
level in Devil's Hole National Monument. Declining water levels threatened
the survival of the Devil's Hole pupfish, an endangered species." The
CappaertCourt found that the monument's purpose was to preserve both the
pool and the pupfish.'' It also noted that while the water right was based
on the purpose of the reservation, it was also limited by it. 9' Thus, the
Cappaerts could pump from their wells until the water level in the pool
dropped below a certain level and no further."
Following Cappaert, in 1981, the Ninth Circuit applied the Winters
doctrine to support a water right for fish habitat in Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton.' The Colville court held that the confederated tribes on
the Colville reservation in North Central Washington had a Winters right to
"sufficient water to permit the natural spawning" of Lahontan trout.' 9
Because the reservation was created for at least two purposes: agriculture
and fishing,'95 and the Grand Coulee Dam destroyed tribal fishing grounds,
the court reasoned that the Indians' had a right to enough water to support
the Omak Lake Lahontan trout fishery established as a replacement
fishery."
The Ninth Circuit applied the Winters doctrine most recently in United
States v. Adair,'" holding that the Indians had a right to enough water to
maintain fishing and hunting on lands once part of the Klamath Reser-

187. Id. at 600.
188. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1975).
189. The federal government listed the Devil's Hole Pupfish on the Endangered Species
List in 1967. Its existence in Devil's Hole has been precarious ever since. See James Deacon,
More Information on the Devil's Hole Pupfish, at http'/www.earthsky.com/2001/esmiOI0618.
html (last visited July 2001).
190. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
191.. Id. at 141-42.
192. Id.
193. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
194. Id. at 48.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).
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vation.'" The court first examined the treaty between the United States
and the Klamath Indian Tribe, containing a clause guaranteeing the Indians
"exclusive on-reservation fishing and gathering rights."' " The court next
considered the historical circumstances under which the treaty was
negotiated, establishing the "central importance of the Tribe's hunting and
fishing rights."' ' Finally, the Court found that "a quantity of water
flowing through the reservation" was necessary to protect the hunting and
fishing right." If the purpose of the reservation is to preserve fishing
rights, then the Winters doctrine guarantees the Indians enough water to
maintain the fishery, even if the water originates off the reservation."
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Kittitas Reclamation
District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District," affirming the lower
court's order requiring the water master to release water to cover salmon
redds. ' Because releases of extra water the previous fall artificially raised
the water level, causing the salmon to spawn higher in the watershed and
further from the main channel than normal, the extra water was required to
cover the redds in the spring?" If the water master hadn't maintained these
flows through the spring, the redds would dry out, essentially destroying the
salmon run for that year. M
Two district courts also recognize a Winters right for the benefit of
naturally spawning fish. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Morton,'" in 1973, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
overturned a regulation issued by the U.S. Secretary of Interior allocating
the waters of the Truckee River between Indians, wanting the water to
protect spawning habitat, and non-Indians, desiring the water for irrigation." ' The court held that, as the tribe's trustee, the U.S. Secretary of
Interior had a fiduciary duty to allocate "all water not allocated by court
decree or contract" to the Indians.' " In a similar case, Confederated Salish

198. Id. at 1417.
199. Id. at 1409.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1410.
202. 1d. at 1410-11.
203. 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985).
204. Id. at 1035. A "redd" is a shallow depression in a suitable gravel bed that the
female salmon excavates with her tail before depositing her eggs. ROBIN ADE, THE TROUT
AND SALMON HANDBOOK 6-7 (1989).
205. Kittitas Reclamation District,763 F.2d at 1033-34.
206. Id.
207. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
208. Id. at 257.
209. Id. at 256.
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and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana v. Flathead
Irrigation and Power Project,"" in 1985, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana granted the Indian tribes an emergency injunction
forcing the United States to release enough water from the Flathead
Irrigation and Power Project to protect tribal fisheries from irreparable
harm.

21

1

The Winters doctrine established that when Congress creates a federal
reservation it implicitly reserves enough water to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. If the reservation is an Indian reservation, and one of the
purposes of the reservation is to protect the Indian's right to catch fish, then
the Winters guarantee is that of enough water to maintain harvestable
populations of fish. It would be but a small judicial step to analogize the
Winters right to the habitat right.
F. The Conservation Necessity
Like the Winters right, the conservation necessity supports the implied
habitat right by analogy. The conservation necessity is the flip side of the
implied habitat right. Whereas the implied habitat right expands the scope
of the Indian fishing right, the conservation necessity limits the scope of the
non-Indian development right. The conservation necessity holds that the
tribes' fishing right does not include the right to fish a given species to
extinction. By analogy, it should also hold that non-Indians don't have the
right to drive a given species of fish to extinction by destroying its habitat.
The conservation necessity flows from a stark biological fact unrecognized
at treaty time: Stevens Treaties fishing rights are limited by the ability of
a given watershed to produce fish. 2 ' At treaty time, these limitations were
difficult to see because nature could produce more fish than humans could
consume.2 3 But since then, habitat degradation and overfishing has
reversed the situation so that treaty fisherman can't even catch enough fish
to support their moderate living needs."
The Supreme Court first recognized the conservation necessity in Tulee
v. Washington,2 'S in 1942, when it struck a balance between the Indians'
claim that the treaty allowed them to fish at usual and accustomed places

210. 616 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Mont. 1985).
211. Id. at 1297.
212. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 668-69 (1979).
213. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd,
520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975).
214. See Request for Determination, supra note 1.
215. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
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free from state regulation of any kind and the State of Washington's claim
that it could regulate Indian fishing at their usual and accustomed places to
the same extent that it could regulate non-Indian fishing."' The Tulee
Court held that the Indians' construction of the treaty was too broad while
the state's construction was too narrow, forging the conservation necessity
from the two extremes."' Fishing restrictions of a "purely regulatory
nature ... as are necessary for the conservation of fish" do not violate the
treaty. But the treaty would not tolerate restrictions designed merely to raise
money. 18
The Court revisited the conservation necessity doctrine in the first two
Puyallup cases. In the 1968 Puyallup I decision, the Court held that the
state had the power to regulate the "manner of fishing, the size of the take,
the restriction of commercial fishing and the like" in the "interest of
conservation," so long as the regulation met "appropriate standards" and did
not discriminate against the Indians." 9 In the 1973 Puyallup 1I case, the
Court was even more direct, stating that the treaty did not give the Indians
"the right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets."2" ' By
the time the Court decided Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of
Washington (Puyallup III)," in 1977, and Fishing Vessel, in 1979, the
conservation necessity had become a background principle of federal Indian
222
law.
Stevens Treaties case law provides a strong foundation from which to
build the proposed implied habitat right. The Federal District Court for
Western Washington explicitly found the proposed right, but the decision
was vacated on appeal. Three other district courts have found that the
fishing clause prevents both public and private parties from destroying usual
and accustomed fishing grounds. Two additional doctrines of Stevens
Treaties case law support the proposed habitat right by analogy: the reserved
water rights doctrine, and the conservation necessity.
IV. The Stevens Treaties Created an Implied Habitat Right
Courts should recognize that the fishing clause of the Stevens Treaties
creates an implied habitat right. Although the courts do not yet recognize
216. Id. at 684.
217. Id. at 685.
218. Id.
219. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
220. Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973).
221. 433 U.S. 165 (1997).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); accord
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
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such an implied right, they have recognized other rights also implied in the
fishing clause: the right of access and the right of equitable apportionment.
Courts recognized these two rights by applying both the canons of
construction and case law to the facts at hand. The canons of construction
require the courts to: 1) construe Indian treaties liberally in favor of the
Indians, 2) resolve ambiguous expressions in favor of the Indians, and 3)
construe the treaties as the Indians at that time understood them. 3 Stevens
Treaties case law requires courts to interpret the Stevens Treaties in a way
that guarantees the Indians enough fish to make a "moderate living" through
fishing."4
A. The Canons of Constructionfor Indian Treaties Support a Holding
that the Stevens Treaties Contain an Implied Habitat Right
The first canon of construction requires the courts to construe Indian
treaties "liberally in favor of the Indians."2" Some courts go so far as to
find hunting and fishing rights on former reservation land even after
Congress abrogated the treaty creating the reservation. For example, the
Adair court, discussed in Part Ill, supra,found that the Indians retained the
reserved water right implied by the treaty creating their reservation even
after Congress terminated the reservation.2 6 If courts can find an implied
reserved water right for hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by a treaty
that is no longer in force, then surely they can find an implied habitat right
for a treaty remaining in full force today.227
The second canon of construction requires courts to resolve ambiguous
expressions in favor of the Indians."' For example, the phrase "in common
with the citizens" is ambiguous. It could mean that the Indians share the
right to catch fish off their reservations equally with non-Indians, so that if
there were nine non-Indian fisherman for every one Indian fishermen, the
non-Indians would get ninety percent of the catch, or the phrase could mean
that the Indians got half the catch and the non-Indians got the other half,

223. See supra notes 85-91.
224. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 686 (1979).
225. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
226. Klamath Indian Tribe v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984).
227. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999)
(holding that the Indians' usufructuary fishing, hunting, and gathering rights on lands reserved
to them by a treaty of 1837 survived an Executive Order from 1850 that removed the Indians
from the lands in question, a treaty of 1855 that expressly abrogated all the Indians' "right,
title, and interest, of whatsoever nature they may be, in the ceded lands," and the Admission
of Minnesota into the Union).
228. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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regardless of the ratio of Indians to non-Indians. The Boldt Decision
interpreted the phrase in favor of the Indians, finding that the Indians and
non-Indians were each entitled to "share equally" in the catch. 29 Therefore,
the Indians received up to half the harvestable salmon and non-Indians the
other half."'
Courts should interpret 'the phrase "right of taking fish" in a similar
fashion. The phrase does not define how many fish the Indians may take or
whether the government is obligated to protect the right in any way.
Nonetheless, it is well settled that the right is not an empty one. The fishing
clause guarantees the Indians something more than the "chance, shared with
millions of other citizens, occasionally to dip their net into territorial
waters."2 3' To resolve the ambiguity in favor of the Indians and make the
phrase meaningful, courts should find the implied habitat right because
without the habitat, there are no fish.232
The third canon of construction has long been the primary canon used by
courts to interpret the Stevens Treaties. 3 It requires courts to interpret an
Indian treaty as the Indians understood it at the time."3 This task is made
somewhat difficult by the fact that historical accounts of the treaty
negotiations do not indicate precisely what the Indians understood the treaty
to mean when they signed it. Negotiations were conducted in the Chinook
patios and precise meanings of the English terms were impossible to
convey.2" Nonetheless, Chinook was capable of conveying the general
meaning of the fishing clause to the Indians.2" To discern the Stevens
Treaties general meaning, courts must explore the historical circumstances
in which the United States and the Indians negotiated the treaty and the
intent of each party, especially the Indians. 3 ' Once the court understands

229. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Boldt
Decision), affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975).
230. Id. at 343.
231. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 686 (1979).
232. See, e.g., RICHARD WILLIAMS (CHAIR), INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN
TO THE RIVER xvi-xx (1996).
233. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 331.
234. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 222 (citing Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S.
620, 631 (1970)). Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated this canon in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 593-95 (1832).
235. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
236. See Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 330.
237. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); accord Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
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the circumstances and the Indians' intent, it must interpret the treaty to give
effect to the Indians' intent.2"
Historical accounts indicate that Stevens and the Indians understood the
fishing clause as a guarantee that the Indians would be able to catch fish at
their usual and accustomed fishing grounds in perpetuity.239 As Stevens
stated in his opening address at the Treaty of Point-No-Point, "this paper
secures your fish."' "MThe Indians took him at his word.' This was the
consideration for which they ceded essentially all of their aboriginal territory
to non-Indians. ' 2 It is in this sense that courts must interpret the fishing
clause today." 3 Courts should hold that the Stevens Treaties contain an
implied promise to protect productive fish habitat. Otherwise, the salmon
face extinction and the treaty guarantee will be broken.
The canons of construction for Indian treaties require the courts to
construe Indian treaties liberally in favor of the Indians, resolve ambiguous
expressions in favor of the Indians, and construe the treaties as the Indians
understood them at the time.2 Applying these canons to today's world of
declining harvests, it is clear the fishing clause guarantee will be broken
unless the courts recognize the implied habitat right.
B. Courts Have Expanded the Explicit Scope of the Fishing Clause to
Protect Indian Fishing Rights in the Face of Declining Harvests
After nearly a century of Supreme Court and lower court decision making,
the central meaning of the fishing clause is well established. The fishing
clause guarantees the Indians enough fish to meet their "reasonable
livelihood needs."2 '" In other words, the treaty guarantees the Indians a
'moderate living" through fishing.' The history of Court decision making
on this subject can be described as a series of contemporaneous responses
to the declining Indian harvest."7 As anadromous fish populations

238. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1998).
239. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 666-67 & nn.7-9 (1979); accord UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 36, at

113-18; see also supra notes 51-57, 61-77 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.

242. Id.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 330 (W.D. Wash. 1974)

affd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975).
244.
245.
658, 685
246.
247.

See supra notes 85-91.
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
(1979) (Fishing Vessel).
Id. at 686.
See Perron, supra note 17, at 790-99.
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declined, the Court consistently readjusted the scope of the fishing right to
insure that the fishery would meet the Indians' needs.'
1. Today's Courts Should Meet the Challenge of Declining Tribal
FisheriesApplying the Same Logic Used By Earlier Courts to Recognize the Right of Access and the Right of Equitable Apportionment
Courts should recognize the habitat right as an element of the fishing right
by virtue of the same logic that spawned the rights of access and equitable
apportionment. During the first half-century of non-Indian settlement in
Western Washington, fish were so abundant that both Indians and nonIndians harvested all the fish they wanted.' 9 After the turn of the
nineteenth century, however, non-Indians began crowding the Indians from
their traditional fisheries. Responding to this inequity, in United States v.
Winans,5" the Supreme Court recognized the right of access. Nearly half
a century later, in the Puyallup cases, the Court began to hint that access
wasn't enough.2"' This hint became black letter law in Fishing Vessel when
the Court affirmed the Indians' right to half the catch. "
In the years immediately following Fishing Vessel and the Boldt Decision,
the allocation scheme was enough to meet the Indian's reasonable livelihood
needs, at least partially.' Now they need more. As the Orrick Decision
held, "the most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish
is the existence of fish to be taken."" Without adequate fish habitat, there
are no fish, making the right to take fish meaningless. If the trend in habitat
degradation continues, "the right to take fish would eventually be reduced
to the right to dip one's net into the water ... and bring it out empty." 5
Such a result violates the fishing clause, the canons of construction, and
nearly one hundred years of litigation on the subject. " ' The Fishing Vessel
Court all but resolved the habitat issue when it rejected the contention that
the fishing clause guaranteed nothing more than an equal opportunity to try
to catch fish." 7

248. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 12, at 440-59.
249. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 659; see also Perron, supra note 17, at 790-99.

250. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
251. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 399-403 (1968); accord
Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973).
252. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685-87.
253. See Request for Determination, supra note 1, at 3-4.
254. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980), affd, 759
F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
255. Id.
256. Id.

257. Id.
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Some federal district court cases came close to recognizing the same
habitat right that the Orrick Decision recognized." For example, the
District Court of Oregon enjoined construction of a dam on Catherine Creek
because it would "destroy" the steelhead fishery above the dam."'
Likewise, the Muckleshoot court found that a proposed marina would harm
the tribes' fishing right because it would both deny them access to their
usual and accustomed grounds and stations and damage the habitat."
Although these cases involved the right of access, it is only a small logical
step from a finding based on access to a finding based on habitat.
2. Today's Courts Should Also Recognize the Habitat Right by Analogy
to the Reserved Water Rights Doctrine and the Conservation Necessity
Courts should also recognize the habitat right by analogy to the reserved
water rights doctrine and the conservation necessity. As discussed in Part
III, supra, the Ninth Circuit found a reserved water right (Winters right) to
support fish habitat on four different occasions." ' These cases all arose
from conflicts between Indians and non-Indians over water in the arid
regions of the Pacific Northwest and they all explicitly found that the
Indians needed the water in order to protect the fish habitat. The issue has
not yet been joined in Western Washington because water is usually not the
limiting factor in the production of wild fish. The limiting factor here is
habitat.
In Western Washington, the Winters doctrine applies to the proposed
habitat right by analogy. If Winters guarantees enough water to fulfill the
purposes of an arid reservation, then, by analogy, it guarantees enough
habitat to fulfill the purposes of a wet reservation. Without the water on the
Colville reservation, for example, the Lahontan cutthroat trout fishery would
have been destroyed. Likewise, by analogy, without the habitat on the
Skokomish Reservation, the salmon fishery was destroyed.
Courts should also recognize the habitat right by analogy to the conservation necessity. Historically, courts always cite the conservation necessity
as a reason to restrict Indian fishing, but non-Indians don't have the right to
destroy the fishery either." Each side is obliged to give something up to
prevent salmon populations from falling below levels necessary to provide

258. See infra notes 259-60.
259. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp.

553, 556 (D. Or. 1977).
260. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
261. See supra notes 193-206.
262. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 684-85 (1979).
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the Indians with a moderate living. The Indians' right to make a living by
fishing is limited by the conservation necessity as expressed in restrictions
on harvest. The citizen's right to make a living by developing natural
resources, on the other hand, should be limited by restrictions on habitat
degradation. While the conservation necessity restrains Indian activities that
may limit salmon population growth (primarily harvest), it should also limit
non-Indian activity affecting salmon production (primarily habitat destruction).
In terms of the treaty right, harvest and habitat degradation are equivalent.
Both over-harvest and unrestricted habitat degradation violate the spirit of
the treaty. Each activity reduces the number of fish available for escapement
and propagation of the species. When the Puyallups asserted their exclusive
right to harvest the fish running through their reservation on the Puyallup
River, the U.S. Supreme Court held that they did not have the right to
pursue the "last living steelhead ' ' 3 on the river to extinction. Likewise, the
state doesn't have the right to develop or degrade the last piece of steelhead
habitat and drive the fish to extinction.
Habitat degradation is a form of harvest. For example, the Lake Cushman
Dams on the North Fork of the Skokomish River on the Olympic Peninsula
harvest nearly the entire natural run of anadromous fish. Before the dams,
the Skokomish River, and more particularly the North Fork of the
Skokomish River, was the most biologically productive river on the Hood
Canal and provided the Skokomish Indians with ample quantities of fish.2"'
After the dams, almost all of the water that previously flowed down the
North Fork was diverted into a power tunnel to generate electricity."
Without the water, the habitat was completely unusable and the fish
perished. ' " In the eyes of the treaty, the dams "harvested" the fish as
completely as any Indian gillnet strung across the river.
V. Conclusion
The fishing right guaranteed by the fishing clause of the Stevens Treaties
has long included the right of access and the right of equitable apportionment. Today, it is time for the courts to recognize the third element of the
fishing right - the proposed habitat right. Following the canons of
263. Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973).
264. See CHINOOK NORTHWEST, INC. & MARTINO & Assocs., ESTIMATED ECONOMIC
DAMAGE TO THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE FROM UNREGULATED CONSTRUCTION AND
OPERATION OF THE CITY OF TACOMA'S CUSHMAN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, 1926-1997,
REPORT FOR THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE 2-3 (1998).

265. Id.
266. Id. at 2-2, 2-4.
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construction, the courts should interpret the Stevens Treaties by determining
what consideration the Indians bargained for when they ceded all claims to
their ancestral homeland, then determine how to honor that consideration
today. This consideration emerges with unmistakable clarity from the
historical record of the treaty negotiations and nearly a century of litigation
on the subject. The Indians gave up their land in exchange for the United
States' solemn guarantee that it would protect their right to fish at their usual
and accustomed places so they could catch enough fish to make a moderate
living from fishing."" The Indians' treaty fishing right is one right made
manifest by three other rights: the right of access, the right of equitable
apportionment, and the habitat right.

267. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
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